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Why Your Enterprise Tech Stack Isn’t Ready for AI Agents —…

Talk by Christopher Lovejoy and Saul Howard on why enterprise technology stacks (healthcare as the central example) aren't ready for AI agents. They argue that a working proof of concept typically fails at compliance requirements — an audit trail, which must be a durable, complete record of every agent action, data touchpoint, and authorization, not a developer log. Their proposed architecture treats constraints first: an immutable append-only event log makes auditability inherent to the storage model (at the cost of harder reads); patient data lives in schema-driven object storage beside the log with events holding only references, enabling debugging without exposure to health data and a natural place for zero-trust enforcement and prompt-injection constraints; escalation treats humans and models as the same kind of agent so either can perform any action the other can; evaluation emerges from these primitives, including on production data that stays within the customer environment. Timestamps cover the enterprise proof-of-concept pattern, audit requirements, the event log tradeoff, healthcare data shape, debugging without data access, zero trust and the "lethal trifecta", escalation, and evaluation as a byproduct of the design. # Channel Identity Observations: "Why Your Enterprise Tech Stack Isn't Ready for AI Agents" ## Explicit Self-Description Evidence ### Speaker Affiliations (stated directly) - **Christopher Lovejoy** self-identifies as *"a member of technical staff at Anthropic"* working as a *"for deployed engineer"* who *"embed[s] within enterprise organizations and help[s] them get value from using AI agents."* He notes prior work at Anterior with Saul. - **Saul Howard** self-identifies as *"VP of engineering at Anterior,"* described as *"a New York-based company selling AI... agentic AI to US health insurance companies."* ### Stated Scope of the Talk - Topic explicitly framed as: *"why enterprise text stacks aren't ready for AI agents and some of the primitives that we've built in the past in order to unlock them."* - Domain scope claim: learnings from healthcare enterprise transfer to *"other regulated industries like finance, defense, government work, anywhere where process is so important and has to be followed."* ## Intended Audience (Observed) - **Enterprise technical practitioners** — the talk assumes familiarity with concepts like *POCs, Data Dog logs, RBAC, event sourcing, VPCs, zero trust, SOC 2, HiTrust, HIPAA*, and system architecture planes (application, control, data). - **Builders in regulated industries** — addressed through healthcare-specific framing: *"a use case that might be familiar to many of you which is the... enterprise proof of concept."* - Audience is invited to engage directly: *"feel free to come and chat to me and Sol about these later. We're very happy to talk"* — suggesting a conference/talk format with in-person access. ## Claimed Scope and Expertise - **Hands-on enterprise deployment experience claimed**: *"Chris and I have spent a lot of time building in enterprise and in healthcare enterprises particularly."* - **Pattern claims based on experience**: - *"what we've seen is that one pattern that can work very well here..."* (human-agent escalation) - *"what we found is that these three primitives... give you effective privacy preserving evals almost as a byproduct"* - *"where I've seen it go wrong is taking that initial POC... and bolting these on as additions"* ## Observable Presentation Patterns - **Format**: Dual-speaker conference talk with handoff (*">>"* markers), scenario-driven structure (health system POC walkthrough), and a four-question organizing frame (audit trail, sensitive data, escalation, evals). - **Pedagogical style**: Concrete framing — *"to make this concrete, let's start by considering a scenario"* — with stakeholder personas (chief of finance, chief medical officer, head of sales) used to illustrate production challenges. - **Technical depth**: Presents four named architectural primitives: **immutable event ledger**, **schema-driven object storage separated from the event stream**, **human-agent equivalency**, and **emergent evals**. - **Borrowed-pattern positioning**: Claims value from established enterprise patterns — *"there are patterns that have worked very well within finance within defense within big tech that can be applied to this kind of system architecture."* ## Distinguishing Claims from Demonstrations | Creator Claim | Demonstrated in Material | |---|---| | Extensive enterprise/healthcare building experience | Not directly evidenced; asserted via self-intro and repeated *"what we've seen/found"* framing | | Patterns work across regulated industries | Analogies drawn (finance transaction logs) but only healthcare discussed in depth | | Primitives yield evals "as a byproduct" | Reasoned argument presented, not empirically demonstrated within the talk | No private motivations or channel-wide conclusions are inferred beyond the above quoted statements. # Delivery Observations: Christopher Lovejoy & Saul Howard ## Speakers & Structure - Two-person talk with alternating segments, marked by `>>` speaker turns: Christopher opens with introductions and the scenario setup; Saul covers the audit trail and data architecture; Christopher returns for escalation, evals, and the conclusion. - Clear **signposting** between sections: - > "Okay. Okay, so then it comes to how do you handle escalation?" - > "And then on this fourth and final question that we're going to talk about um eval" ## Narrative / Teaching Habits - **Scenario-driven framing**: the core teaching device is a fictional enterprise POC ("proof of concept") walkthrough: > "let's start by considering a scenario that might be familiar to many of you which is the of enterprise proof of proof of concept, the enterprise PC." - **Question-as-content pattern**: production challenges are framed as stakeholder questions ("can I see the audit trail", "who's approving the decisions here?", "who's approving the decisions here?"), then each is answered architecturally. - **Explicit scope management**: > "for the purposes of this talk, we're going to focus on these four, the highlighted ones... just in the interest of time, we'll stay focused." - **Trade-off framing** repeated by Saul: introduces a pattern, then asks "what's the trade-off": > "And of course these are trade-offs. So what's the trade-off you're making here?" - **"What do I want to make easy?"** as a recurring design heuristic: > "I think often about what do I want to make easy? What are when I'm choosing my constraints..." ## Vocabulary & Recurring Terms - Repeated domain vocabulary: **audit trail, immutable, event log / event sourcing, object storage, schema-driven, zero trust, PHI, RBAC, lethal trifecta, evals, primitives, POC**. - "Immutable" recurs across sections (ledger, object storage) as a deliberate unifying motif. - Analogies to other industries: finance transaction logs, legal evidence: > "It say agents decisions came up in a court of law. Could we show a justifiable chain of evidence..." ## Tone & Register - Conversational, filler-heavy ("um", "uh" throughout), consistent with a live talk rather than scripted delivery. - Modest, hedged claims: "what we've seen is that one pattern that can work very well here is...", "I think we could say that..." - First-person experience cited as evidence: "I've seen customers where...", "where I've seen it go wrong is..." ## Closing Move - Ends with a **contrast takeaway** (wrong vs. right approach): bolting enterprise requirements onto a POC vs. treating constraints "as the architectural principles that you're going to build everything upon," followed by a simple "Thank you for your attention." ## Uncertainty - Attribution of some mid-transcript segments to a specific speaker is uncertain due to sparse speaker markers; the Saul/Christopher split above follows the `>>` cues and content continuity. - The transcript is likely auto-generated (e.g., "PC" for "POC", "SOCK 2" for "SOC 2", "LM" for "LLM"), so some exact wording is uncertain. # Observation Record: Why Your Enterprise Tech Stack Isn't Ready for AI Agents ## Speakers - **Christopher Lovejoy** — Member of Technical Staff at Anthropic, forward-deployed engineer embedding in enterprise organizations; previously worked at Anterior with Saul. - **Saul Howard** — VP of Engineering at Anterior, a New York-based company selling agentic AI to US health insurance companies. ## Framing Claims - **Saul:** Healthcare is a very challenging place to develop and deploy AI because of process/compliance and regulatory requirements, and the direct real impact on people's lives — which also makes it rewarding. - **Saul:** Learnings from healthcare enterprise transfer to other regulated industries (finance, defense, government) — anywhere process must be followed. - **Christopher (scenario setup):** The typical enterprise "PoC" path — scope, define metrics, allocate engineers, build four weeks, get good results, present to stakeholders — leads everyone to assume the hard part is done, when getting to production is really the challenge. ## The Four Production Questions (Christopher) When productionizing, stakeholders raise questions; the talk focuses on four: 1. **Audit trail** — complete record of every agent action and data access for compliance. 2. **Sensitive data handling** — how data is passed to the agent; strict data boundaries. 3. **Escalation/approval** — e.g., escalation to a clinician for certain decisions. 4. **Evals** — how the agent continues to perform well. - Two further questions (untrusted data manipulating the model; integrations with Epic, Salesforce, etc.) were explicitly set aside "in the interest of time." ## Position 1: Audit Trail — Immutable Event Log (Saul) - **Claim:** An audit trail demanded by security teams under frameworks like **SOC 2, HiTrust, HIPAA** is far more than a developer log (e.g., DataDog); it must be a complete record of every action, data access, and authorization. - Framing test: > "If the agent's decisions came up in a court of law, could we show a justifiable chain of evidence for why particular actions were taken?" - **Reasoning:** Architect by deciding *what to make easy*; adopt the **transaction log / event sourcing** pattern from finance — an append-only, timestamped, complete, unified log that is the single source of truth across parallel agents. - **Consequence claimed:** Auditability "becomes trivial... it's impossible not to be able to roll back time." - **Trade-off acknowledged:** Writes become very easy; reads become harder (needing caching/snapshots), though Saul notes healthcare often *wants* multiple after-the-fact interpretations of recorded events, which ephemeral computed projections of the log make easy. ## Position 2: Sensitive Data — Schema-Driven Object Storage (Saul) - **Constraint:** Healthcare data (PHI) is legally restricted beyond HIPAA; agents, like humans, must access only data necessary at that point in time; RBAC applies; some customers won't let data leave their on-prem VPC. - **Data characteristics cited:** complicated, non-hierarchical, mixed structured/unstructured, very large (single pieces can exceed a megabyte). - **Proposed pattern:** immutable, schema-driven **object storage**, with the event log containing only *references* to data blobs. - **Claimed benefits:** - Developers can debug/observe agent steps **without access to PHI** (seeing schema shape only). - Enables **zero trust**: agents bear tokens and access data at point of use; data doesn't flow freely. - Mitigates **prompt injection / "lethal trifecta"**: the architecture makes it impossible for the agent to access other data within the same process holding prior data. ## Position 3: Escalation — Human-Agent Equivalency (Christopher) - **Challenges stated:** escalation timing is dynamic/unpredictable (LLM self-uncertainty or rules, e.g., treatment above a threshold); LLMs and humans process context differently (LLMs handle massive text; humans don't). - **Proposed pattern:** the platform enforces a wider definition of "agent" encompassing **both LLMs and humans**, so any action an LLM can take, a human can take. Downstream steps don't care who acted upstream. - Shared context definitions can be mapped to agent-friendly forms (prompts) or human-friendly forms (UIs). ## Position 4: Evals — Emergent from the Primitives (Christopher) - **Stated difficulties:** LLM non-determinism makes causal attribution of output changes hard; offline datasets may not represent production data; data drifts over time. - **Claim:** The three primitives yield **effective privacy-preserving evals "almost as a byproduct"**: - Immutable ledger enables **replay** — tweak a prompt/model/code and see exact direct impact. - Human-agent equivalency lets both perform a task; their difference is the eval score. - Object storage allows running evals on production data **inside the customer's environment** without exposing it. ## Meta-Takeaways (Saul and Christopher) - **Architecture principle:** take constraints seriously, choose what to be simple, accept that other things become hard; existing enterprise patterns (finance, defense, big tech) can be applied, combined "in new sometimes radical ways" for AI. - **Failure mode (Christopher's observation):** taking the promising PoC point solution and bolting on enterprise requirements (evals, security, auditability) afterward yields something **brittle and hard to generalize**. - **Success mode:** treat production-scale enterprise constraints as architectural principles from the beginning, then "build back up towards that PoC accuracy using your new primitives." ## Preserved Qualifications - Saul explicitly notes the event-sourcing trade-off (harder reads) rather than presenting it as cost-free. - The enterprise-stack diagram is acknowledged as simplified: "much much more than we're showing here." - Two stakeholder questions were deliberately deferred, not answered. # Speaker Attribution & Provenance Record ## Video - **ID:** `01a15ca7-cd11-7296-ac52-b395a8a2dda6` - **Title:** *Why Your Enterprise Tech Stack Isn't Ready for AI Agents — Christopher Lovejoy & Saul Howard* ## Identified Speakers & Roles | Speaker | Role (self-identified) | Affiliation | |---|---|---| | **Christopher Lovejoy** | Co-presenter; Member of Technical Staff at Anthropic, forward-deployed engineer | Anthropic; previously at Anterior | | **Saul Howard** | Co-presenter; VP of Engineering | Anterior (New York-based company selling agentic AI to US health insurance companies) | - Both speak as **presenters/creators** of the talk; no narrator, guest, or audience speakers are identified. - Speaker turns are not timestamped; attribution between the two speakers is partially inferable from transcript cue markers (`>>`) and role context. Passages on audit trails, data storage, and architecture reflections align with the Anthropic forward-deployed role; passages introducing the POC scenario and escalation/evals alternate with the second speaker. **Uncertainty:** exact turn boundaries are not explicitly labeled. ## Referenced Sources & Third-Party Claims - **Security/compliance frameworks named in speech:** SOC 2, HITRUST ("High Trust"), HIPAA — cited as examples of enterprise security frameworks, no external documents referenced. - **Third-party systems named:** Epic, Salesforce — mentioned as example enterprise integrations; no claims made about them. - **Concepts referenced:** prompt injection / "lethal trifecta," event sourcing, zero trust, RBAC, PHI — used as terminology, not cited sources. - No external studies, articles, or data sources are cited. ## Promotional Segments - **Anterior company description** (Saul's intro: "New York-based company selling AI... agentic AI to US health insurance companies") — brief self/employer identification; not flagged as an explicit promotional segment. - No other promotional content present. ## Availability & Limitations - **Comment availability:** Not indicated in supplied material. - **Curated metadata:** None supplied beyond title and transcript. - Transcript contains minor artifacts (snorts, throat clearing, transcription typos) noted as-is. Hello everybody. My name is Christopher Lovejoy and I'm a member of technical staff at Anthropic. Uh, and I work as a for deployed engineer. So I embed within enterprise organizations and help them get value from using AI agents. and I previously worked at Anterior with Saul. \>\> Hi everybody, I'm Saul. I'm VP of engineering at Anterior. We're a New York-based company selling AI uh Aentic AI to US health insurance companies. Um Chris and I have spent a lot of time building in enterprise and uh in healthcare enterprises particularly and uh healthcare is a very challenging place to develop and deploy AI. \[clears throat\] Healthcare is so challenging because of the requirements around uh process and uh compliance the regulatory uh requirements that that that are so important also because of the uh direct real impact that your work has on people's lives which is of course also what makes it so rewarding. Um I think a lot of the learnings you can take from working in enterprise for healthcare you can take to enterprise in other regulated industries like finance, defense, government work, anywhere where process is so important and has to be followed. And in this talk, we're going to talk about um some of the learnings that we've had and specifically we're going to talk about why enterprise text stacks aren't ready for AI agents and some of the primitives that we've built uh in the past in order to unlock them. And to make this concrete, let's start by considering a scenario that might be familiar to many of you which is the of enterprise proof of proof of concept, the enterprise PC. And let's say we have identified a customer that we want to serve and we've identified a priority use case with them. So obviously we're on the healthcare track here. Let's consider a um a large health system and a use case that is some sort of administrative healthare workflow. So you work with them, you scope out a PC, you define the metrics that you are going to care about and you're going to bench benchmark yourselves on. Um you allocate to engineers, you spend four weeks building it. And um the actual buildout might look a little bit something like this. \>\> An enterprise stack is very complicated. It's much much more than we're showing here, but generally you can have an application layer, a control plane layer, the data plane for your PC. You're going to need some access to the model provider as well. And your PC is going to need access to data across all of these different planes. It may some in the data lake, some directly from the application layer, for example. And so you're going to deploy it something like this. It's going to connect to all these different places. There's going to be some offline data pulling. there's going to be some maybe some online generally you'll get access to the data and push towards the results and so things go well you you get great results the the AI performs you know as you expected you you hit the performance metrics um you know it's fast it's relatively cheap and you hold a meeting you present this to the relevant stakeholders and everyone seems pretty happy um so you know your chief of finance um in the in the company is very excited and wants to understand what's going to be the impact on the budget for next here. Uh, your chief medical officer is excited to tell his his colleagues, you know, how accurate his AI is. Um, and the head of sales asks, okay, when can we put powered by AI? When can we put that on the websites? Um, but the problem is everyone here is assuming that the the hard part is done, that the AI was was the challenging part, but actually, as we know, often getting things into production is really where the challenge lies. Um, and to get a bit more specific on what that challenge looks like, um, you hold a meeting the next day. you bring in the relevant stakeholders to discuss productionizing this proof of concept application and somebody raises their hand and says um can I see the the audit trail for this like for us for compliance it's critical that we can see every step every action that the agent takes every piece of data that it accesses can can you give that to me and you realize that actually you know with the way things have been implemented in the initial PC without these um kind of true integrations that actually that's going to be quite challenging and then somebody else um pops up with some other questions so somebody asks okay well actually how is data sensitive data being handled here? Um how's that being passed to the agency? You know, we have a very strict boundary around where our data can go and where it can't go. Um is is this respecting that? How does that look? And then your chief medical officer says, "Okay, and who's approving the decisions here?" Because we know in certain scenarios we have to escalate to a clinician who will then uh you know approve or or or not agree with what the agent is saying. Um so how does that happen? Like what's the mechanism for that? And over the course of the meetings you know you can imagine you get more and more questions. So, can untrusted data manipulate the model? How do we know that the agent continues to perform well? How do we deal with integrations? How do we connect to Epic, to Salesforce, to the other kind of applications that we care about? And for the purposes of this talk, we're going to focus on these four, the highlighted ones. For the other two, feel free to come and chat to me and Sol about these later. We're very happy to talk, but um just in the interest of time, we'll stay focused. And let's start with uh this one about the audit trail. \>\> So, this is a question you're guaranteed to get from the security team. they're going to want to see an audit trail. And for programmers, an audit trail sounds very like a typical developer log that you might have in Data Dog. Surely it's it's it's a similar kind of thing. But for security frameworks that exist in the real enterprise world like SOCK 2, High Trust, HIPPA, an audit trail is is a bit more than that. It it has to contain a complete record of absolutely every action that the agent took. It has to contain all of the places where the agent accessed data, all of the authorization by which the agent did something. It's it's this complete record in in a much more fundamental way. And uh you one way of thinking about it is in a legal sense. It say agents decisions came up in a court of law. Could we show a justifiable chain of evidence for why the particular actions were taken by a decision? And that's something that could easily happen within the healthcare context. For example, when I think about architecting systems like this, I think often about what do I want to make easy? What are when I'm choosing my constraints, I'm saying, okay, these are the things I want my system to be easy and let that drive the tradeoffs that that I'm going to make. And a particular pattern that uh uh is used in lots of different industries, for example, in finance is a transaction log, an immutable record of events that store all of the transactions that happen throughout the system. And this is appendon timestamp log. It's complete. So this is your source of truth for all of the data of the system. And it's unified. So there is only one source of truth across all of the different agents that you might have running in parallel for example and architecting in this way making this trade-off uh means that auditability becomes trivial. It falls out of your data storage paradigm that you've chosen. It's sort of it's impossible not to be able to roll back time and and see exactly the state of the system at a a particular point in time and be able to uh provide that as an audit trail for what happened uh at at each point in time. And of course these are trade-offs. So what's the trade-off you're making here? I think we could say that for uh this kind of event logging or sometimes called event sourcing pattern writes become very easy. So you just drop an event. reads become more difficult because you have to uh read through all of the events in order to reconstruct a view of what happened and there are patterns like caching and snapshots that you can bring to to to make that that simpler but there always is more effort there although I have seen in in the healthcare context that actually you're going to want different interpretations of the raw data that your agents recorded after the fact. So for example, it might be that uh more events happened and that changes the interpretation of the healthcare journey and you want a different view of this the source of truth at that particular time and this pattern makes that easy because uh all of your views of the data are ephemeral computed projections of the event log. Um okay next the compliance officer comes and is asking how is the sensitive data passed around the system what's the life cycle of data within our system and within a healthcare context as we all know data means a lot it's PHI protected or personal health information it's uh has legal restrictions around it not just HIPPA but other legal restrictions about the use of people's data you cannot have your agent Just as you cannot have humans accessing and reading and utilizing healthcare data that they don't absolutely have a necessity to use at at that point in time for that particular uh journey and so again architecturally when I think about how am I storing data within a particular system I would like to think what is the shape of the data what kind of characteristics does the data have for healthcare data that might be that it's very complicated It doesn't follow strict hierarchical um relationships. It's uh sometimes unstructured and it's sometimes structured. It could be very large. For example, healthcare data, one piece of healthcare data can easily be over a megabyte in size or or much more than that. Uh it has strict access controls as we've been saying. The rback comes into play like uh both for humans and and then for agents downstream of that. Uh it may even be we I've seen customers where they're not willing to have their healthcare data leave their own environment, leave their on-rem VPC for example. So we have tangential access to their to their data. And so an architectural paradigm I might go to is object storage. Schemadriven object storage I think is a good fit for this. It's matches well with the choice of using event logging because you can separate the two. So the events we talked about as the record of what the agent is doing at any particular time only contain references to the schemadriven blobs that are the storage of the actual healthcare data itself. And uh it's important therefore that the healthcare data is stored immutably again so that you can always go back in time and reconstruct what data the agent had access to at that particular point in time. This separation of events for what happened and object storage for the data that was used at that particular point in time has actually some some very useful benefits. For example, with a system like this, it's possible for developers to go back and debug and have observability over what happened, what particular steps the agent took, why it did that, and and retrace the agent's steps without having access to the personal health information itself. Although because of the schema driven, they can see the shape of that data, they they can't and to be honest, often won't be able to be given access to that healthcare data. So you can separate out observability and orchestration and instrumentation from the healthcare data itself. This then has another benefit which is zero trust. It it the object storage becomes a place where you can apply zero trust principles. Your agents can bear tokens and use those tokens to access the data at the point of use and not allow data to flow around the system as it likes. This then leads into a mitigation for uh prompt injection for the lethal trifecta. The way I think about the lethal trifecta is can I solve for the constraint if I have an agent at point A with access to this data. Is it possible within my architecture for the agent to be also accessing data over here? And zero trust principles, tokens beared by the agents and object storage segregated from the uh event stream that has your orchestration logic gives you a place to be able to solve for that constraint. It won't be possible for the agent to access data within the same process that that you've given it the the previous data. \>\> Okay. Okay, so then it comes to how do you handle escalation? And in many scenarios, you will want to be able to escalate a decision that an agent makes or an action that an agent makes to a human. But one of the challenges here is that this is quite dynamic. So you don't know in advance when exactly perhaps the agent's going to escalate. It could be that you're asking the AI to escalate when it's not sure. Um it could be that you define some sort of rules in your system. Maybe in a medical context the treatments going above a certain threshold means that it needs to be escalated uh for an approval. \[snorts\] But this makes it very challenging um because of this this inability to predict. And a second challenge is also that humans and LMS ultimately process context differently. You know LM will have no problem if you give them massive massive amounts of text but humans um that's not the case. So what we've seen is that one pattern that can work very well here is if in your platform you enforce kind of a wider definition of agent which encompasses both LLMs and humans then you can make it such that any action that can be taken by an LLM could also be taken by a human and this is helpful because at any point in the kind of chain of actions that your agent is taking it can escalate to a human. the human could perform that action and then any step downstream doesn't care about whether it was a human or an LM that did those actions upstream. Um and on the second point around the context, what this also uh makes much easier is that you can define methods that take the context which has some kind of shared definition of context which is irrespective of whether it's a human or an LM that's going to be accessing it and you can take those methods to then map into something that's agent friendly like a prompt or into something that's more human friendly for example a UI. Okay. And then on this fourth and final question that we're going to talk about um eval obviously you know we hear a lot about evals we know that evals can be very helpful that often they drive decision-m about the types of model you want to use the type of approach you might want to use um within your product but we also know that evals can be pretty hard and there's various factors here we \[snorts\] know that LLMs are not deterministic so it can be quite tricky to pin down the precise change that led to some sort of change in output um we also know that the data that you might put in an offline data set might not necessarily represent production data and it could be that um maybe you sampled from data but actually that sample isn't truly representative and then you also have drift of data um over time so maybe your offline data set is now out of date and what we found is that these three primitives that we've described described so far in the talk actually give you effective privacy preserving evals almost as a byproduct um without needing to kind of bolt something onto the side of of your um architecture. So to make that more concrete, so the immutable ledger, what this means is that you can replay your actions. So you can go back to any particular time, you know, in this kind of sequence of events, you can see the complete state of the system at that point in time. And if you wanted to, you could then make very specific tweaks. So you could tweak a prompt, you could tweak a model, you could tweak the code, and you can see the exact direct impact of that because you have all of that context. Secondly, you have this human agent equivalency which means that for any task you could get both the agent, the LLM agent and the human to perform it and your difference is your eval that gives you the eval scores. And then finally, what the object storage enables you to do is to actually run these evals on production data um including inside your customer's environment without actually ever exposing that data. and you can get your eval results without the sensitive data ever needing to come to where your agent's performing the work. Right? So, we've gone through four architectural principles that we found useful for building in healthcare and more generally in regulated environments for enterprise. the immutable ledger of actions, the orchestration adjacent object storage, the human agent equivalency and the way that with these three principles eval can emerge as a first class property of the system rather than as something you attach onto the side. I think one of the metas here is that I like to think about architecture as taking your constraints very seriously and thinking about what you want to be simple within the system and then choosing the trade-offs for that. And of course alongside that some things will become hard but it's the things that are simple that are most important to you. And that there are patterns that already exist across enterprises that solve for a lot of these things. And sure with AI we need to combine them in new sometimes radical ways and bring in other way other pieces but there are patterns that have worked very well within finance within defense within big tech that that can be applied to this kind of system architecture and I'd say the takeaway is that where I've seen it go wrong is taking that initial P that um that point solution that showed so much promise and that that showed the high accuracy for example and then trying to build up from it, strapping on the enterprise requirements as you come across them. Okay, we need evals, we need uh security, we need auditability and bolting these on as additions to the the the foundations of the PC. You end up with something very brittle, something very hard to uh uh externalize and to generalize across different use cases. But where I've seen it go well is if you take the constraints of a productionready scaled enterprise uh system seriously from the beginning and treat those as the architectural principles that you're going to build everything upon and then build back up towards that PC accuracy using your new primitives. Thank you for your attention. Thank you.